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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1958, Charles David Keeling began measuring the
concentration of carbon dioxide (C02) in the atmosphere, at a site
11,000 feet above sea level near the top of Mauna Loa on the "big
island" of Hawaii. The time series of monthly averages, the "Keeling
Curve," is the iconic figure of climate change (see Figure 1). The curve
oscillates and rises. The annual oscillations (whose details are seen in
the Figure's inset) are the consequences of the seasonal breathing of
the northern-hemisphere forests, which remove C02 from the
atmosphere during their growing season and return C02 to the
atmosphere as their leaves decay on the forest floor in winter. The
steady rise--on average today, about 0.5% per year-is due primarily
Keynote Address, Symposium, Supply and Demand: Barriers to a New Energy Future,
*
Vanderbilt Law Review (Feb. 24, 2012) (co-sponsored by the Climate Change Research Network
and the Environmental Law Program). The Keynote Address was presented via videoconference.
Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Co-Director, The Carbon Mitigation
Initiative, and Director, Siebel Energy Grand Challenge, Princeton Environmental Institute,
Princeton University. Drew Staniewski, recent graduate of Vanderbilt University Law School,
and Michaela Poizner, Senior Articles Editor of the Vanderbilt Law Review, assisted with the
editing of this piece. Suggestions for revision of earlier drafts by David Socolow and Oliver
Morton were particularly helpful.
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to the burning of fossil fuels. Indeed, the average rise would be twice
as fast if all of the C02 released during fossil-fuel burning stayed in
the atmosphere. Roughly half of the C02 emissions from burning fossil
fuels stay in the atmosphere, one quarter go into the ocean (making it
more acidic), and one quarter enter forests that, despite deforestation,
are growing bigger.'
Atmospheric CO2 at Mauna Loa Observatory
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Figure 1: Monthly average CO2 concentration at the Mauna Loa Observatory, 1958
through April 2012. The vertical scales are number of C02 molecules per million
molecules of atmosphere (left) and billions of tons of C02 (GtCO2) in the atmosphere
2
(right, author's addition).

The era of consciousness of climate change began with
Keeling's intrepid measurements. 3 The seasonal oscillations in Figure
1 were unexpected, and it was soon clear that atmospheric CO2
measurements were a new index of global human impact. The political
message was that the global atmosphere mixes and retains a large
part of the world's C02 emissions, oblivious to what fuel is burned, in
what country, and for what purpose. Again and again over the past
fifty years, modelers have estimated future human emissions on the
The reader interested in delving further into climate science can read or browse the
1.
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (SUSAN SOLOMON ET AL. EDS., 2007), available at
Of particular interest is the
http://ipcc.ch/publications-and-data/ar4/wgl/en/contents.html.
"Frequently Asked Questions" section.
ADMIN.
OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC
in Carbon Dioxide, NAT'L
2.
Trends
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
3.
Charles D. Keeling, Rewards and Penalties of Monitoring the Earth, 23 ANN. REV.

ENERGY & ENV'r 25 (1998).
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basis of assumptions about the economy and technology, while
environmental scientists have gradually improved their ability to
describe the likely consequences for global warming, sea-level rise,
ecosystem disturbance, and hydrocycle disruption (storms, floods,
droughts, etc.).
The landmark international treaty, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"), is often
called the Rio Convention, because it was negotiated in Rio de Janeiro
at the "Earth Summit" in June of 1992. As can be discerned from
Figure 2, the rate of fossil fuel emissions almost tripled between 1958
and 1992 (from 8.5 to 22.7 billion tons of CO2 per year, an average
increase of 2.9% per year for thirty-four years). By 2010, it had
increased by another 40% (to 33.5 billion tons of C02 per year, an
average increase of 2.2% per year for eighteen years) and was four
4
times larger than in 1958.
Estimates of Global Carbon Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Combustion and Cement Manufacture
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Figure 2: Annual emissions of C02, 1850-2010, from fossil fuels, cement, and the flaring
of gas at oil fields. (Flaring is barely visible, and occurred only in the 1970s.) The
vertical scale displays annual emissions. Note that the unit is million metric tons of
carbon, not C02. To convert to million metric tons of CO2, multiply by 3.667. The 2009
'5
and 2010 data are "preliminary. '

4.

Estimates of Global Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Combustion and Cement Manufacture,

CARBON DIOXIDE

INFO. ANALYSIS

CTR., http://cdiac.ornl.gov/images/preliminary-2009-2010-

fossil-carbon emissions.jpg (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
5.
Global C02 Emissions From Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement Manufacture, and Gas
Flaring: 1751-2008, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CENTER (June 10, 2011), http://cdiac.ornl
.gov/ftp/ndp03O/global. 1751 2008.ems.
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I write soon after returning from "Rio + 20," a blockbuster
United Nations event in June 2012 celebrating the twentieth
anniversary of the Rio Convention. The mood in Rio was sober. United
Nations diplomacy appeared to be shutting down. Judging from
political rhetoric, discussion of climate change in the United States
has already shut down. A premise of this Essay is that the current
impasse has little social value. This Essay is about finding "restart
buttons."
I am addressing "the environmental community," by which I
mean all those who engage with environmental issues, notably climate
change, whether professionally or simply because they find the issues
compelling. The environmental community extends well beyond the
environmental activist community and the environmental nongovernmental organizations. My assumption is that nearly all
members of the environmental community, independent of where they
stand on particular issues, feel frustrated by the current incoherent
state of affairs and the lack of progress. The environmental
community definitely includes me, which is why, below, I frequently
refer to this community as "we." Only in the final section of this Essay
do I use "we" to refer to all of humanity.
In my view, the environmental community does not need to
wait for economic recovery or political reform or the withering away of
disinformation campaigns. The central argument of this Essay is that
we will find "restart buttons" when we become better at telling truths
to ourselves.
II. COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE
There are two novel ways by which the environmental
community, in its role as messenger of climate change, could tell the
story with greater empathy and candor. We could acknowledge that
(1) climate change is unwelcome news, and (2) the best and worst
outcomes consistent with today's climate change science are very
6
different.
Climate change is unwelcome news. Never in history has the
work of so few led to so much being asked of so many. The few are the
climate scientists. They have developed a solid case that increases in
C02 emissions threaten our well-being. The many are the rest of

6.
A previous exploration of these issues can be found in Robert Socolow, Wedges
Reaffirmed, CLIMATE CENT. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.climatecentral.orgiblogs/wedgesreaffirmed/.
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humanity. Everyone would rather live on a bigger planet-a planet,
say, as large as Jupiter-where our day-to-day activities mattered far
less. On our planet, however, the insights from climate science reveal
that humankind is a powerful agent of undesired change.
The natural reaction of anyone hearing unwelcome news is to
shoot the messenger. Scientists brought such profoundly unwelcome
news twice before. In 1610, Galileo pointed his telescope to the night
sky, saw the phases of Venus and the moons of Jupiter, and published
his observations in Starry Messenger. The English poet John Donne
realized immediately that here was compelling evidence that the earth
was not at the center of the universe, and that this news would be
devastating to established political and social hierarchies. He wrote,
only months later, in The FirstAnniversary:
And new philosophy calls all in doubt,
The element of fire is quite put out;
The sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's wit
Can well direct him where to look for it...
Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone,
All just supply, and all relation;
Prince, subject, father, son, are things forgot,
For every man alone thinks he hath got
To be a phoenix, and that there can be
None of that kind, of which he is, but he.
This is the world's condition now.

Galileo, the messenger, was not actually shot, but in 1633 the
Inquisition in Rome found him "vehemently suspect of heresy," and he
was required to "abjure, curse, and detest" the Copernican theory.
Galileo was confined to his home for the remaining eight and a half
7
years of his life.
Two and a half centuries after Starry Messenger, Charles
Darwin published The Origin of Species. Darwin argued that human
beings were part of the animal kingdom, another decidedly unwelcome
idea. Although held in high esteem by his colleagues, he was mocked
in the popular press, and his findings are still widely dismissed.
Thus, no one should be surprised at the fierce resistance to
climate-change science, nor should anyone expect that resistance to
crumble quickly. The idea that humans cannot change our planet is as
7.

DAVID WOOTTON, GALILEO: WATCHER OF THE SKIES 5 (2010).
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out-of-date and wrong as the earth-centered universe and the separate
creation of man. But all three ideas have such appeal that they fade
away only very slowly.
The best and worst outcomes consistent with today's climate
change science are very different. Neither slow nor rapid arrival of
severe climate change can be ruled out, given our poor understanding
of the many ways by which the earth's atmosphere, oceans, ice, and
forests can amplify or dampen what are initially relatively small
disturbances, arising from the earth's not quite circular orbit around
the sun. The earth is a physical system with many complex positive
and negative feedbacks. This key message from climate science is not
what most nonscientists read or hear, because the media, politicians,
and environmentalists-and sometimes the climate scientists
themselves 8 -prefer to describe a simpler world with distinct zones of
safety and peril. The working assumption of nearly all communicators
is that the general audience requires simplification, and that, in
particular, the public cannot comprehend risk.
My problem with this working assumption is that it is belied by
how people, every day, incorporate information about an uncertain
outcome and act to reduce its consequences. Well aware that they do
not know if there is a patrol car around the next bend in the road,
drivers still usually drive slowly enough to avoid getting a ticket for
speeding. At a far different scale, people reduce the consequences of
uncertain outcomes by buying fire insurance and life insurance, and
they reduce the probability of these same outcomes by replacing the
frayed insulation on electric wires in their homes and eating healthily.
Why should various lay audiences be unable to process and act on the
information that no one knows how soon our actions on this planet
will bring on dangerous climate change, nor exactly what "dangerous"
means, because climate change science is seriously incomplete?
My ecologist colleague, Steve Pacala, explains to lay audiences
that "there are monsters behind the door." Scientists do not know how
strong the door is. They do not know how quickly the Greenland and
West Antarctic ice sheets will melt, nor whether the near future will
bring significant greenhouse gas releases from the arctic tundra and
more intense hurricanes. A public convinced that our collective future
could bring an array of menacing risks-and accepting that current
knowledge of these risks is incomplete-may endorse forceful actions
I explore how climate scientists communicate uncertainty about extreme events in
8.
Robert H. Socolow, High-Consequence Outcomes and Internal Disagreements: Tell Us More,
Please, 108 CLIMATIC CHANGE 775 (2011).
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by its leaders to reduce those risks. Might talking straight instead of
second-guessing the audience be a "restart button"?
In the remainder of this Essay, with an emphasis on finding
ways to freshen the conversation, I will address energy demand and
supply and international politics.

III. DEMAND
If you look at a map of the national highway system in the
United States (Figure 3), it becomes a Rorschach test. The mind can
go in many directions. It may go to the extraordinary political and
technological achievement of building and operating the system, to the
connectedness of the country, to the opportunities for travel and
tourism, or to urban sprawl and the changing nature of land use. We
in the environmental community see vehicle fuel, the global oil
market, and CO 2 emissions. Vehicles (cars, trucks, planes, and ships)
are responsible for nearly all of the consumption of petroleum not
associated with petrochemicals and for about 30% of national CO 2
emissions. 9

Figure 3: The U.S. national highway system.

10

9.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2035, at 76 fig.72 (2012), availableat http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf.
10. File: National Highway System.jpg, WIKIPEDIA (July 18, 2005), http://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/File:NationalHighwaySystem.jpg.
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Figure 4 is the equivalent of Figure 3 for electricity. In the
United States, the past half century saw the building of power plants
contemporaneously with the building of the highway system. Power
plants are responsible for about 40% of national CO 2 emissions:
roughly 30% from coal plants and 10% from natural gas plants. To
understand power plants in terms of energy demand, one needs to
know that 70% of U.S. electricity is consumed in buildings-for
lighting, cooling and heating systems, appliances and electronics-and
about equally in residential and commercial buildings. 1 Often, the
most cost-effective societal alternative to any kind of power plant is no
power plant at all, but, rather, an economy-wide investment in better
appliances and air conditioning systems.
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Figure 4:Power plants in the United States.12

Individual emissions. Rarely today are consumers aware of
how their various demands for energy create their carbon footprints.
One way I like to convey this information is to connect the C02
emissions from specific activities to the globally averaged annual percapita emissions from the burning of fossil fuels, currently about four

tons Of C02n per year (30 billion tons Of C02 per year, divided by 7
billion people). Each of several activities, by itself, gets the American
11. Id.
12. SANDRA GOODMAN & MICHAEL WALKER, E 3 VENTURES, BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS
8 fig.3 (2006), available at http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/benchmarking/2004[benchmark2004
.pdf.
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all of his or her four-ton-per-year global share. Take vehicle use: if you
drive 15,000 miles per year (which many of us do) in a car averaging
forty-five miles per gallon (which most of us do not have), your car
emits four tons of CO 2 per year. If you drive a car that gets twenty-two
miles per gallon, you reach your global share after driving only 8,000
miles. You also use up your global share by flying 15,000 miles per
year on commercial passenger aircraft-economy class. (Your
emissions are the plane's emissions divided by the number of people in
the plane-taking into account the space required for economy-class
vs. business-class seats.) If you heat your home with natural gas in an
average temperate climate like Princeton, New Jersey, where I live,
that will approximately use up your global share, too, if you live alone.
Electricity usage is more complicated because the carbon intensity of
your local electricity matters: 300 kilowatt-hours a month will use up
your global share when all the power comes from coal. Given the
number of ways that an American can emit as much C02 as the
world's average person, it is hardly surprising that the average
American emits five times the global average, about twenty tons per
year.
Technology can help reduce the C02 emissions from buildings
and vehicles, but recent history shows its limitations. Since the early
1970s, researchers, industry leaders, and policymakers have
collaborated to create regulations that make buildings, appliances,
and vehicles more efficient. But these efforts have been countered by
bigger homes, additional appliances, peppier vehicles, and more
extensive travel. Evidently, along with energy efficiency, people value
much else. They value privacy, independence, safety, comfort, beauty,
and a variety of experiences. Yet "bottom up" projections of future C02
emissions and emissions-reduction potential for homes and vehicles
rarely recognize these desires explicitly. How refreshing it would be to
see web-based carbon-footprint software for calculating an individual's
carbon footprint that not only probes an individual's specific
consumption patterns but also the values that drive this consumption.
Might more open discussion of modern lifestyles be another "restart
button"?13
Project evaluation. Countless projects have as one of their
goals C02 emissions reduction relative to some standard. Whether

13. A good entry into the literature about energy use and behavior is Thomas Dietz, Gerald
T. Gardner, Jonathan Gilligan, Paul C. Stern & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Household Actions Can
Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NATL ACAD.
SCI. 18452 (2009).
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outcomes match intentions can only be discovered through
measurement and analysis. In the words of Ronald Reagan, "trust but
verify." Easier said than done. Both public and private institutions are
almost guaranteed to resist verification, believing that they have more
to lose than to gain by finding out how well their projects have
performed.
A case in point is the Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design ("LEED") rating system (certified, silver, gold, platinum)
managed by the U.S. Green Buildings Council. Over the past two
decades, LEED has effectively raised awareness of the extent to which
a building design determines energy use. One reason LEED is a
popular institutional invention is that the building is rated entirely at
the design stage; the rating is not affected by what happens during
construction or after the building is built. There is a missed
opportunity here. One can hope that those responsible for the LEED
rating system will soon incorporate a learning process among building
professions that promotes the integration of design, construction,
commissioning, and operation.
Population. The size of the world's population is another
complex subject that the environmental community has been avoiding.
In the 1970s, by contrast, population and environment were joined at
the hip. A popular textbook of the time by Paul and Anne Ehrlich and
John Holdren carried the title: Ecoscience: Population, Resources,
Environment. The story of why and when the environmental
community jettisoned population from its domain of direct concern is,
thus far, untold. Population must reenter the conversation. I often say
to my students, "You may be participating in recycling programs or
planning to make your first car a hybrid, but the decision you will
make in your life with the most impact on natural resources and
sustainability is how many children to have." In response, I get a
blank stare; forty years ago there would not have been blank stares.
The actual future population will have an enormous impact on
the quality of life on this planet, and it is far from determined. The
United Nations brackets the global population in 2100 by a "high"
value of 15.8 billion and a "low" value of 6.2 billion 14 (see Figure 5).
The high and low estimates result when the average woman has 2.6
and 1.6 children, respectively. Just one extra child, and the result is
nearly 10 billion extra people!

14.

U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2010

REVISION, HIGHLIGHTS AND ADVANCE TABLES, at xv (2011), available at http://esa.un.org/unpd
/wpp/Documentationlpdf/WPP20 l0Highlights.pdf.
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The perils of the UN's "high" scenario, where by 2100 the
global population more than doubles, relative to today, are many.
Assuming that the world continues to find paths to sustained
economic growth, the environmental pressures on the atmosphere, the
food system, and biodiversity will be immense-as will be the
crowding in public spaces, in commercial airspace, and on the roads.
Population of the world, 1950-2100, according to different projections and variants
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Figure 5: United Nations global population projections through 2100 and historical data.
The highest line projects the population when there is no lowering of the fertility (the
number of children per woman) in any country. The high, medium, and low projections
correspond to transitions everywhere to 2.6, 2. 1, and 1.6 children per woman and lead to
15.8, 10.1, and 6.2 billion people in 2100. The medium projection, with "replacementlevel" births, is seen to create a stable population.",

Under the low projection, the global population peaks around
2050 at approximately 8 billion people. By 2100, it is falling at the
rate of 0.8% per year.' 6 A continued fall in the global population at the
15. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2010
REVISION, HIGHLIGHTS AND ADVANCE TABLES, at xvi fig.1 (2011), available at http://esa.
un.org/unpd/wppDocumentatioi/pdf/WPP20 10-.Highlights.pdf.
16. For the United Nations "low" trajectory, the world population is 6,228 million in 2099
and 6,177 in 2100,'a growth rate of -0.82%. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD
POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2010 REVISION (2011), http://esa.un.orgfunpdl/wpp/ExcelData/population.htm (follow "Total Population-Both Sexes" hyperlink; then select the "Low" tab
in the associated spreadsheet).
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rate of 0.8% per year throughout the twenty-second century would
lead to fewer than 3 billion people by 2200-without war or pestilence.
The world population was below 3 billion people until 1960.17
One reason the environmental community has disengaged from
the subject of population growth is that the problem simply is not as
dire as it was. Great strides have been taken in the past few years in
most parts of the world toward smaller families. In addition,
problematic features of the transition to a level population are
becoming better appreciated, notably the aging of the population. The
increase in the fraction of older people and the decrease in the fraction
of children will preoccupy nearly every country through much of the
twenty-first century. The "medium" UN scenario predicts almost 800
million people above the age of eighty in 2100-roughly 8% of the
global population.1s
The environmental community could reconnect with population
issues by challenging national policies that reward parents for large
families-so-called "pro-natalist" policies, now in place or under
discussion in many of the industrialized countries where populations
are actually shrinking or are on track to decline. Issues such as
cultural survival (in what year will the last Italian be born?) would
need to be joined. The population issue is about more than population
growth in the developing world.
IV. SUPPLY
There are further examples of the environmental community
not quite telling itself the truth in the domain of energy supply. For
starters, although we, like much of the U.S. public, are fascinated with
new ways of producing energy, the story of carbon in the United
States is above all a story about old coal power plants. Built primarily
in the sixties, seventies, and eighties, coal power plants are outdated
and inefficient bastions of C02 emissions (as well as emissions of air
pollutants having direct impact on public health). Owners of coal
plants expend most of their political capital ensuring that current
plants are allowed to keep running because the capital that was
required to build them is largely paid off and the profits are large.
Politicians in coal-power states work to preserve the competitive
advantage of low-cost power. Grandfathering, retiring, relicensing,

17.

JOEL E. COHEN, How MANY PEOPLE CAN THE EARTH SUPPORT? 401 (1995). Cohen's

book is an excellent reference for population-environment linkages.
18. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at xvi.
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repowering, and retrofitting: resolving these contentious issues
provides immense leverage for any long-industrialized nation wishing
to reduce its CO 2 emissions. By contrast, these are not the dominant
issues for a now-industrializing nation like China, where most of the
electricity comes from power plants built in the last decade.
The many factions who participate in the formulation of lowcarbon energy policy argue heatedly with one another. Advocates of
nuclear power and advocates of renewable energy rarely join forces. In
this domain, self-deception extends well beyond the environmental
community. It takes the form of believing that alternatives to your
favorite option are not worth taking seriously. In my view, if you are
an advocate of any low-carbon energy technology, you will be much
better prepared for the fray if you assume that the technologies you
most dislike are going to be strong competitors. For every option that
you dislike, focus your attention on "conditionality." Every option can
be done badly or well. Under what circumstances could you accept the
deployment of one of the alternatives you do not like, as a companion
to the deployment of one you do like? The reason your attention to
conditionality is so important is that every nominal "solution" to
climate change has a dark side, and proponents of that solution are
not the ones who can be counted on to identify what can go wrong. 19
In what follows, I briefly discuss how conditionality might
affect four specific technological options for managing climate
change-C02 capture and storage ("CCS"), biocarbon, nuclear power,
and geoengineering.
C02 capture and storage. The debate over CCS within the
environmental community today is both polarized and consequential.
There are two views. One view sees coal, oil, and natural gas as
energy sources on their way out, giving way to a new world of
renewable energy (alternatively, although rarely, to a new world of
nuclear energy). From this perspective, new fossil fuel power-and
especially new coal power-is out of step with the march of progress.
The opposing view (which I hold) sees fossil energy as a fierce
competitor indefinitely. Specifically, this view welcomes technologies
that enable new kinds of coal and natural gas power plants with
greatly reduced C02 emissions, which CCS power appears poised to
deliver.

19. I first made the case for parallel efforts to address climate change in two papers with
Stephen Pacala. See S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem
for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 (2004); Robert H. Socolow &
Stephen W. Pacala, A Plan to Keep Carbonin Check, SCI. AM., Sept. 2006, at 50.
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Whether at a new or retrofitted power plant, and whether the
fuel source is coal or natural gas, CCS requires that a potential
emitter of C02 instead traps and redirects nearly all of the C02
produced during burning so that it never enters the atmosphere. The
most studied destination is the porous geologic formation deep
underground. A power plant that captures C02 is considerably more
expensive than one that does not, and storage creates additional costs.
Electricity from CCS plants can become competitive with conventional
power plants only in regional power markets that have imposed a
significant (direct or indirect) price on C02 emissions. In some cases,
the power plant owner can reduce the cost penalty by selling captured
C02 to owners of depleted oil fields, who can use the C02 for
"enhanced oil recovery" (which high oil prices promote), while storing
the C02 in the process. A regional energy system containing hundreds
of CCS facilities linked by an extensive C02 pipeline infrastructure is
worth detailed examination.
Today's discussion of CCS within the environmental
community rarely gets to this stage. Rather, especially in Europe and
especially regarding coal, those who drive the discussion of climate
change mitigation rule out CCS-enabling policies on the grounds that
they facilitate the continuation of the fossil fuel era. Hardly anyone
hostile to coal asks whether there is a level of performance in the coal
industry-in mine-worker safety, management of acid runoff, land
restoration, air pollution control, or other domains where the coal
industry has earned the hostility it now faces-that is good enough to
warrant accepting coal's long-term contributions to the energy system.
If such questions were asked, perhaps a middle ground could be
reached, where all new coal power is CCS power. Absent such efforts,
coal power without CCS will probably prevail, and C02 emissions
associated with coal power will experience little downward pressure.
Biocarbon.
"Biocarbon," in the context of this Essay,
encompasses all the ways in which biological strategies could slow
climate change. There are stock strategies and flow strategies. Stock
strategies transfer the carbon in the atmosphere (where the carbon is
present almost exclusively as C0 2) to another "carbon reservoir," such
as a forest; planting a tree, for example, will result in carbon moving
from the atmosphere to the tree while the tree grows. Restoring
previously forested land (afforestation) is an example of a stock
strategy. Flow strategies exploit the substitutability of biological
energy for fossil energy: to keep warm one can burn either wood or
coal in a furnace. A successful modern biomass industry, whether
based on forest residues or dedicated crops like sugar cane, will delay
climate change by allowing some petroleum to stay below ground.
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Stock strategies and flow strategies compete for land with each
other and with the demands of agriculture, animal husbandry, timber,
paper, parks, and wilderness. Conditionality for biocarbon strategies
means ensuring that other functions of land are not overwhelmedthat biomass expansion does not divert land from agriculture nor lead
to the clearing of forests. Imagine that you are a forester or
agronomist fostering some biocarbon initiative that has no associated
conditionality. Your focus will be on storing as much carbon or
growing as much biofuel as possible, and your plan may run
roughshod over other land-use objectives. Good policy design will
require getting into the heads of foresters and agronomists and
creating the incentives and penalties that will lead them to fulfill the
multiplicity of objectives that must govern the management of
increasingly scarce land.
Nuclear power. To become a major contributor in this halfcentury, nuclear power would need to expand rapidly across the world,
by a factor of three to five globally, relative to today. 20 Much on the
minds of all those who struggle with nuclear power's potential are
conditionalities related to power plant safety (especially after
Fukushima) and nuclear waste disposal (which, with few exceptions,
is not yet solved anywhere). But there is an additional conditionality,
one that in my view is even more important: a precondition for a
global expansion of nuclear power is the creation of much higher
barriers between nuclear power and nuclear weapons than now exist.
Today, as the falling cost of uranium enrichment and the legitimation
of commercial plutonium lower these barriers, some nuclear power
advocates are at last acknowledging these links. 2 1 With weapons
couplings at the front of our minds, Alex Glaser and I recently wrote,
"[W]e judge the hazard of aggressively pursuing a global expansion of
nuclear power today to be worse than the hazard of slowing the attack
22
on climate change by whatever increment such caution entails."
Nuclear power expansion does not need to be so fatefully linked with
the prospect of nuclear war. One constructive step would be to manage
international civilian uranium and plutonium in ways that reduce the
risks of regional nuclear arms races. Barriers would be introduced to
restrict the production of weapons-usable materials and their
20.
Robert H. Socolow & Alexander Glaser, Balancing Risks: Nuclear Energy & Climate
Change, DAEDALUS, Fall 2009, at 31, 32-33.
21.
Anne Lauvergeon, The Nuclear Renaissance:An Opportunity to Enhance the Culture of
Nonproliferation,DAEDALUS, Fall 2009, at 91. At the time, Lauvergeon was the Chief Executive
Officer of AREVA.
22.
Socolow & Glaser, supra note 15, at 41.
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diversion to national military programs. However, no country is
currently willing even to discuss the minimal sacrifices of sovereignty
that would be required. Even worse, more countries are finding
nuclear weapons attractive. This can only increase the proliferationrelated risks of a global expansion of nuclear power.
Geoengineering. Advocates of geoengineering think about
conditionality, even though most of the public knows very little about
what geoengineering might entail. Anticipating a contentious debate,
the advocates are getting out in front, asking themselves what
constraints they would want to put on research, deployment,
evaluation, and governance. They are encouraging the early arrival of
ground rules.
Geoengineering, in its most discussed manifestation, would
involve deliberately decreasing incoming sunlight to counteract the
warming from greenhouse gases. Today's earth reflects about 31% of
incoming sunlight to space; especially good reflectors are cloud tops
and ice, but every surface struck by sunlight contributes. Sunlight
that is reflected does not warm. Modifying the planet to reflect an
additional 1% (so that a total of 32% is reflected) would cool the
earth's surface by roughly as much as greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere will have warmed the surface from the onset of the
Industrial Revolution to the middle of this century. 23 One way to
increase our planet's reflectivity is to imitate the most powerful of past
volcanic eruptions. These eruptions create stretches of unusually cool
weather globally for a year or more by sending millions of tons of
sulfur oxides into the stratosphere where they form long-lasting
reflective particles. Human beings could loft particles into the
stratosphere with rockets or guns or balloons.
Conceding the limitations of current climate science, one
should be wary of a climate strategy based on the perpetual
replication of artificial volcanoes. Nonetheless, given that (as noted
earlier) the rate at which humanity will confront nasty manifestations
of climate change is uncertain, geoengineering might be a welcome
option some decades from now. It will not be available as an option,

23. An increase from 31% to 32% in the fraction reflected would reduce the rate of solar
warming by between three and four watts per square meter of surface area of the earth. This is
sufficient to compensate, approximately, for an increase in warming due to a doubling of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere relative to preindustrial times, a situation that will be
reached at mid-century in the absence of serious action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See
THE ROYAL SOCIETY, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY

24 (2009), available at http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/RoyalSociety-Contentpolicy/
publications/2009/8693.pdf. For a full discussion, see id. at 23-36.

2012]

TRUTHS WE MUST TELL OURSEL VES

1471

however, unless efforts begin now to improve scientific understanding
of how such schemes might be implemented and their associated
environmental risks.
There is a large overlap between the areas of climate science
that are priorities for climate research and those receiving greatest
attention in geoengineering discussions-notable areas are clouds and
aerosols. Yet, at present, the leadership of the climate research
community sees more peril than gain in acknowledging-much less
promoting-this overlap. Geoengineering today carries a stigma.
Geoengineering is unlikely to progress until there is broad discussion
of what so many people find so troublesome about it.
Thus far, geoengineering has received scrutiny only from
scientists, engineers, and a few philosophers. As the general public
and its representatives become aware of geoengineering, they are
likely to insist that the desirability of geoengineering under any
circumstances be debated before conditionality is addressed.
Important aspects of the relationship between human beings and the
larger natural world are transformed fundamentally on a
geoengineered planet. In a debate on geoengineering, one can
anticipate, for example, that some will argue for preserving
randomness and surprise.24 A debate over such basic principles is
needed, but it is not yet in view.
To be consistent, those of us who frame climate change as risk
management must promote not only more ambitious climate science,
but also an early beginning for geoengineering research. Thus, the
way forward would seem to require, first, a broad debate that engages,
on the one hand, the deep religious structure of the offer that
geoengineering is presenting to humanity and, on the other hand, the
worst-case prospects for climate change that are currently consistent
with climate science. I anticipate that a consensus will emerge-in a
few places, but not everywhere-that a geoengineering research
program would be prudent. Where this consensus emerges, climate
science could be reimagined and reconfigured so as to encompass
geoengineering research as a significant but subordinate enterprise.
The need to understand more deeply how the earth works would still
dominate.
The more the world fears climate change, the less those of us
ourselves with slowing its arrival can allow ourselves to
concern
who

24.

Similar arguments are found in related debates about the problematic outcomes of

genetic engineering. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE
AGE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING (2007).
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be squeamish about imperfect solutions. We must remind ourselves
that we want solutions to work. It cannot be enough for us to identify
what is wrong with a strategy as it is first proposed. We must ask
ourselves: What changes would be required for the strategy to become
acceptable? How might the world get from here to there? After due
consideration, in some cases, we may conclude that this is an option
we cannot recommend. In most cases, this will be tantamount to
recommending that some alternative options be scaled up. But in
cases where every other strategy has reached some state of maximum
deployment, in effect we would be recommending that the world
endure some incremental damage from climate change rather than
make the compromises required to prevent it.
In short, climate change is a problem of risk management. It
requires balancing the risks of disruption from climate change and the
risks of disruption from mitigation. Humanity can do too much or too
little. To give Hippocrates the last word, "I will apply, for the benefit of
the sick, all measures that are required, avoiding those twin traps of
25
overtreatment and therapeutic nihilism."
V. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
C02 emissions continue to rise rapidly in many developing
countries, while across most of the industrialized world emissions
appear to have peaked. Defining the industrialized world as the
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), about 40% of global emissions from burning
fossil fuels now originate from their territories, and that fraction is
falling. 26 Ultimately, the developing world will decide what kind of
planet earth becomes. If, on balance, most of the larger developing
countries judge that the slowing of climate change is an urgent
matter, they will drive the world toward a low-carbon economy. If,
however, they decide that adapting to climate change has higher
priority than reducing its severity, investments in resilience will
dominate investments in so-called "clean tech," and global C02
emissions may rise throughout this century. Only for a few more
decades will the major industrialized countries be able to lead by
example and persuasion.
25.
26.

Louis Lasagna, Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version (1964).
In 2009, OECD emissions were 12.0 billion out of a global total of 29.0 billion tons of

See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD FACTBOOK 2011-12: ECONOMIC,
ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SOCIAL STATISTICS 200-01 (2011), available at http://dx.doi.org/
C02.

10.1787/factbook-2011-78-en.
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Historically, the UNFCCC put the burden of addressing
climate change exclusively on developed countries, while excusing the
developing world. The operative phrase in the 1992 Rio Convention,
"common but differentiated responsibilities," inhibited global
planning. Such a two-tier world fits a "post-colonial" mindset: it aligns
guilt in the developed world with entitlement in the developing world.
Long overdue in my view, developing and industrialized countries in
recent years have begun to acknowledge that all of humanity is in the
same boat. The world is at last inventing "post-post-colonial"
institutions.
Beyond per capita emissions. In a post-post-colonial world,
leaders will concede that most of the emissions in developing countries
arise not from billions of very poor people but from individuals with
consumption patterns mirroring their middle-class and upper-class
equivalents in industrialized countries. Right now, this reality is well
disguised in arenas like the United Nations because discussion only of
national per capita data is allowed. Indeed, in aggregate, non-OECD
per capita emissions are three to four times smaller than those of the
OECD, and many developing countries have hardly started on the
path toward industrialization. But five-sixths of the world's population
lives outside the OECD and produces 60% of global emissions. It has
become critical to think about emissions in a different way.
I wrote a paper with several colleagues in 2009 that addressed
this issue. 27 Using World Bank income distributions and total national
carbon emissions, and assuming carbon emissions mirror wealth
within countries, we were able to assign all the global emissions of any
given year across the world's inhabitants. We found that of the world's
6 billion people in 2003, about 700 million were emitters of more than
ten tons of C02 per year (we called them "high emitters") and
accounted for about half of global emissions. Very roughly, among the
high emitters there were 200 million Americans, 300 million citizens
of OECD countries other than the United States, and 200 million
residents of countries outside the OECD. By 2030, we estimated
(based on several forecasts of future emissions across regions of the
world) that there would be 1.2 billion high emitters, more than half of
them outside the OECD, and that they would be associated with an

27.
Shoibal Chakravarty, Ananth Chikkatur, Heleen de Coninck, Stephen Pacala, Robert
Socolow & Massimo Tavoni, Sharing Global C02 Emission Reductions Among One Billion High
Emitters, 106 PROCEEDINGS NATL ACAD. SC. 11884 (2009).
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even higher fraction of total emissions. 28 We conjectured that a focus
on high emitters could help political leaders find common ground and
conceivably could even bridge the divide between industrialized and
developing countries that has thwarted "burden sharing" agreements
29
for specific global emissions targets.
Two degrees. Perhaps the most important self-deceptions today
are associated with a fixation on the long-term goal called "two
degrees" by much of the environmental community. 'Two degrees" is
shorthand for a precise objective: the goal is to limit the rise of the
average surface temperature of the earth to two degrees Celsius, or
3.6 degrees Fahrenheit, relative to a time before the Industrial
Revolution. Before 1800, for many centuries, that temperature is
known to have been reasonably stable. Since 1800, it has climbed
about 0.7 degrees Celsius. To oblige their environmental
constituencies, many political leaders have endorsed the "two degrees"
goal.
The goal is more than rhetorical; national leaders and
environmentalists have linked it with three operational objectives that
are more actionable. From the most distant in time to the most
immediate, the three alternative restatements of the "two degrees"
objective are: (1) a total atmospheric concentration of greenhouse
gases at the end of the century that does not exceed the equivalent of
450 C02 molecules per million molecules of atmosphere; (2) a global
total emissions rate of greenhouse gases at mid-century that does not
exceed half of the current emissions rate; and (3) a trajectory for
global emissions of greenhouse gases that peaks during the next
decade. The "two degrees" goal and its three restatements are used
interchangeably, which cuts through much ambiguity about exactly
how such goals are connected. All formulations reveal a mindset that
is common to the entire exercise: to create maximum pressure for
action. The action most on the minds of the proponents of "two
degrees" is deep transformation of lifestyles and the industrial

28. Shoibal Chakravarty, Robert Socolow & Massimo Tavoni, A Focus on Individuals Can
Guide Nations Towards a Low Carbon World, CLIMATE SCI. & POL'Y (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www.climatescie nceandpolicy.eu2009/11/a- focu s-on-individuals -can-guide -nationstowards-a-low-carbon-world.
29. "Historical responsibility" for the C02 added to the atmosphere is the working name for
another set of climate-related issues that are currently complicating international diplomacy.
For some of the implications of historical responsibility, see Massimo Tavoni, Shoibal
Chakravarty & Robert Socolow, Safe vs. Fair: A Formidable Trade-Off in Tackling Climate
Change, 4 SUSTAINABILITY 210, 210-26 (2012).
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structure of the OECD. Implications for developing country
industrialization receive little attention.
The last point is where I return, once more, to the need to tell
truths to ourselves. Pressure for action in the OECD is appropriate;
being casual about the pathways to low-carbon industrialization is
not. There is no way that any tough climate target can be reached
without intense participation from the major developing countries that
are building cities and infrastructure right now and locking in future
emissions from their power plants and road systems and apartment
blocks as they go. The environmental community must do all it can to
make low-carbon industrialization salient to the decisionmakers-in
both developing and industrialized countries. Now is the time to set in
place the domestic and international institutions that can deliver lowcarbon industrialization via involvement in the detailed features of
the developing world's emerging infrastructure and cities.
Distorting the discussion of low-carbon industrialization is the
reality of extreme poverty in the developing countries. One-third of
the world's people, nearly all of them living in developing countries,
are enjoying hardly any of the benefits of economic development.
Moreover, according to the World Bank's projections of patterns of
economic development, this fraction will stay at one-third for at least
another two decades. Yet, as my colleagues and I showed
quantitatively in the 2009 paper cited above, if all of the world's
poorest people were to have the lifestyles of the nearly poor (with at
least some vehicle transport, lighting, refrigeration, and electronics),
30
there would be only a minimal increase in global C02 emissions.
Poverty eradication and the slowing of climate change are decoupled
objectives, even though industrialization and climate change are not.
The "two degrees" target would be extremely ambitious even if
a coordinated global effort were to materialize somehow. Yet,
currently, the environmental community has little appetite for
discussion of any goal that is less stringent. No one appears to be
preparing for a time-possibly quite soon-when a consensus develops
that a peaking of emissions in the 2020s will not occur and that
therefore (at least in this meaning) "two degrees" will not be attained.
The two-degree target has focused the mind and conveyed urgency.
But it is already time for the environmental community to begin
exploring targets that correspond to a relatively less difficult goal that
nonetheless requires immediate, major national commitments and

30.

Chakravarty et al., supra note 22.
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international coordination. 31 An important reason to tell truths to
ourselves is to protect ourselves against becoming disheartened when
the world fails to stay below "two degrees" and thereby losing even
more time developing the will to start again.
VI. PLANETARY IDENTITY

The Obaia Administration has conducted an exercise to
32
establish a price for C02 emissions, based on estimates of damages.
Already, such prices are entering regulations establishing efficiency
and emissions standards at the Departments of Energy and
Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency. The
question arises: Whose damages count? The Obama Administration
decided that damage everywhere in the world had to be included. In
effect, Americans will buy more efficient water heaters in part to
reduce the severity of heat waves in France and droughts in Africa. By
accounting for damage everywhere, the United States is promoting
reciprocity: France might take damage to the United States into
account when establishing its own emissions-related regulations. The
overall result might be a larger total global investment in slowing
climate change. Debate about which damages to include has already
begun.33
The Obama Administration's choice will need to be defended.
Someone must accept the assignment of communicating to political
leaders and the general public that responding effectively to climate
change will require some erosion of national sovereignty-an example
of which is the inclusion of damages to citizens of other countries
when a country decides how much to reduce its own C02 emissions.
This task is fraught. Human beings are so deeply tribal. Nonetheless,
I think the environmental community cannot evade this task, because
climate change is a planetary phenomenon.
If my own experience is relevant, the transition toward a global
sensibility may be self-enforcing for those who take climate change

31.
For a mathematical discussion of alternative targets, see R.H. Socolow & S.H. Lam,
Good Enough Tools for Global Warming Policy Making, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCY A
897, 897-932 (2007).
32. Robert E. Kopp & Bryan K. Mignone, The U.S. Government's Social Cost of Carbon
Estimates After Their First Two Years: Pathways for Improvement, ECON.: THE OPEN-ACCESS,
OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-J., May 2012, at 4, available at http://www.economics-ejournal.org/
economics/jour nalarticles/201 2-15/version_1/count.
33. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1591-96 (2011).
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seriously. Although I had strong international interests beforehand,
engaging with climate change has produced a planetary identity that
augments my previous loyalties to family, town, religion, and nation.
It will be interesting to see how a world of nation-states copes with
ever greater numbers of people who have a planetary identity.
Working on climate change produces not only a new sensibility
about geographical space but also a new sensibility about future time.
In the past fifty years, thanks to science, we human beings have
become far better informed about the history of our universe, our
earth, and life. But we have become hardly at all more intelligent
about future time. In particular, we have not devoted any systematic
thought to our collective destiny as a species on this planet.
Traditional religions dwell on what happens to us as individualslongterm, in heaven or hell, but not on what happens to humankind here
on earth long-term. A new academic discipline may develop as
scholars pursue the art and science of looking ahead. Perhaps it will
be called Destiny Studies.
It seems quite within the capabilities of the human
imagination to achieve a depth of understanding of the next fifty years
of human civilization, and the next five hundred years, and the next
five thousand years. At present, there is little capacity to distinguish
between what we owe our grandchildren's generation and more
distant future generations. In a continuing effort to define ethically
responsible nuclear waste disposal, countries routinely allocate
resources to preventing a cancer induced by a radioactive decay a
million years from now. Roads and pipelines, parks and wilderness
areas, historical buildings and institutional endowments-all of these
raise issues with long time horizons. To deal adequately with the
values at stake in decisions with long time horizons, of which climate
change is just one example, humanity will need Destiny Studies.
In the course of this Essay, I have suggested many areas where
the environmental community needs to ask itself difficult questions.
In spite of how hard these questions are, when I take a fifty-year view
I find grounds for optimism. The world has a terribly inefficient
energy system today, so there is much room for improvement with
focused effort. Most of the physical infrastructure that will operate in
2062 has not been built yet. And carbon emissions have just begun to
be priced. Moreover, many smart and committed young people now
find energy problems exciting and challenging, which was not the case
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even five years ago. Fortunately for all of us, our science has
discovered threats fairly early, we can identify numerous helpful
technologies, and we have a moral compass that tells us to care about
all of those alive today and about the collective future of our species.
What has seemed too hard becomes what simply must be done.

